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1 INTRODUCTION 
For a long period ‘security’ was both a central, yet extraordinarily underdeveloped, 
concept in International Relations. Critical scholarly attention really dates from the 
pioneering work of Barry Buzan (1983). Since then varying security perspectives have 
proliferated. Environmental security became the subject of a long-running debate and 
the 1994 UN Human Development Report introduced the people-centred approach of 
human security (Dalby 2009). It is now commonplace not only to emphasize national 
border security, but also refer to food security, water security, and other ‘sectoralized’ 
security areas (Brauch et al. 2009). This expansive re-definition should alert us to the 
significance of the ‘referent object’ or, in other words, ‘that which is to be secured’. In 
orthodox security studies, there is no doubt that the object of security policy remained 
the integrity of the state and its interests. There might be reference to people, but as 
Buzan (1983, p. 245) noted, there was always ‘an unbreakable paradox’ between state 
and individual security. In much recent security discussion notions of threat may have 
changed, as in the typical security triptych of ‘terrorism, failed states and weapons of 
mass destruction’, but the preservation of the state remains the essential object of 
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policy. Energy security, often with overtones of control over contested scarce resources, 
is conventionally seen as a central component of the national interests of a state and not 
infrequently a casus belli. This is also true of the overwhelming bulk of environmental 
security discussions including those relating to the actual and possible conflict 
consequences of global climate change. However, the really radical move would be to 
shift the object of security from the state to human populations and then to the earth’s 
climate upon which they depend.1 
  While there are several significant greenhouse gases (GHGs), current mitigation 
efforts concentrate on energy-related carbon emissions which, in 2005, accounted for 
around 61 percent of all GHG emissions (Baumert et al. 2005) and whose importance 
rises in line with increasing global energy consumption. In Europe, the figure is even 
higher at 80 percent (European Commission 2007, p. 3). This physical link lies behind 
the evolution of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) over 
the past decade. It largely explains why energy and climate change agendas have 
become increasingly intertwined. The particular characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol 
meant that, for an extensive period, most Parties were able to avoid this conjunction. 
Non-Annex I developing countries were not required to make any reduction in their 
fossil fuel-based emissions and the EU could sustain its climate ‘leadership’ without 
having to make significant cuts in energy use through the fortuitous use of the 1990 
baseline in its burden-sharing agreement. The United States, which would under the 
Protocol have had to make real and economically damaging energy-related reductions, 
simply opted out; while others either failed to meet their obligations or were able to take 
advantage of carbon offsets. In the post-2012 discussions, which followed entry into 
force of the Protocol in 2005, the energy-climate connection became all too painfully 
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clear and dominated the international discussions leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen 
Conference of the Parties (CoP). At the highest level, climate politics became 
international energy politics and could be portrayed as a competition to secure shares in 
a diminishing ‘carbon space’ or, perhaps, to ensure that the burdens of reductions in 
energy use should be borne by others. Energy security has habitually been associated 
with ‘high politics’ and it was noticeable that, in this regard, the climate CoP at 
Copenhagen departed markedly from other analogous ‘low politics’ environmental 
regimes. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to understand the energy-climate nexus 
within a security framework. We proceed by initially analysing both domains in their 
own terms. The energy security agenda is characterized by (geo)political and material 
(scarcity) constraints, and governance responses have largely been confined to the 
national arena. By contrast, climate change has long been subject to multilateral, UN-
related governance processes. Explicit security lenses have been applied to the potential 
short- and long-term impacts of climate change. Associated policy responses can be 
broadly categorized as reactive or preventive. Finally, the third section provides a 
conceptual and institutional comparison between energy security and climate security 
agendas and considers the important question of ‘synergies’ between them, leading 
perhaps to the elusive ‘win-win’ solution under which a progressively de-carbonized 
economy might provide for really comprehensive security in terms of climate stability, 
sustainable energy and the avoidance of the more disruptive traditional threats 
associated with rapid climate alteration. 
 
2 ENERGY SECURITY 
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The standard definition of energy security was forged amidst the oil crises of the 1970s 
and remains a conceptual cornerstone: ‘access to secure, adequate, reliable, and 
affordable energy supplies’ (Bordoff et al. 2009, p. 214). It should also be remembered 
that for producers, energy security means continued demand and market access. Energy 
security represents a broad, if rather vague, placeholder for a range of policy-making 
priorities. Admittedly, it does not adequately address other important aspects of energy 
governance such as carbon emissions or overall environmental sustainability. To keep 
these concerns separate nonetheless reflects the reality of policy-making where 
successful policy integration is rare, whilst parallel, competing tracks are still the norm. 
But even according to the orthodox definition, there have been plenty of reasons in 
recent years to highlight growing energy insecurity. The rise of major energy-
consuming economies, such as China and India, has lowered overall confidence in 
‘secure’ and ‘affordable’ energy supplies. Affordability may be compromised due to an 
increasing imbalance between the demand and supply of fossil fuels and especially the 
widespread recognition of ‘the end of easy oil’. Secure access may be at risk because 
increasing scarcity implies greater international competition and encourages a move 
away from market allocation towards ‘statist’ forms of energy security. 
 Historically, realist theoretical assumptions have dominated thinking on energy 
security. Widespread recognition of the role of energy resources during the build-up and 
conduct of the Second World War ensured the status of energy as an issue belonging to 
the ‘high’ politics of national security. The role of energy as a ‘strategic good’ par 
excellence is not only related to its essential function in ‘fuelling’ military activities. Its 
price level and availability also play a fundamental role in a country’s economic 
performance and socio-political stability (Lesage et al. 2010, p. 183). A realist 
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interpretation of energy security was further reinforced by events in the 1970s when a 
trend towards the nationalization of energy supplies and the sporadic use of oil 
embargoes, orchestrated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), highlighted the dangers of energy dependence. Even today the privileged 
position of major energy-exporting countries still represents a constraint on the foreign 
policy agenda of major importers (Müller-Kraenner 2008, p. 27). 
Market expansion and low energy prices from the 1980s until the mid-2000s 
encouraged the development of liberal approaches to energy security. Greater 
diversification of sources and a gradual shift to coal and natural gas all but eliminated 
the threat of an effective use of the ‘oil weapon’. Well-functioning global markets for 
oil – and potentially for liquefied natural gas – have been increasingly promoted as 
effective mechanisms to provide cheaper energy inputs in an increasingly competitive, 
global economy and guard against both structural undersupply and short-term supply 
disruptions (Goldthau and Witte 2009). Realist notions of energy security, however, 
have not been superseded. On the contrary, Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the so-
called BRIC states – are not just consuming increasing amounts of fossil fuels. They 
also employ the traditional, statist tools of energy security policy such as bilateral 
contracts and the promotion of national energy champions (Lesage et al. 2010, p. 27). 
China and India have struck numerous energy deals with oil- and gas-exporting 
countries from around the world, even if this has meant giving economic and military 
aid to ‘pariah’ states in Africa and Latin America (Müller-Kraenner 2008, p. 72). While 
this has served to raise rather than lower the availability of fossil fuels on global 
markets, it demonstrates that – given an uncertain future – no major power will rely 
exclusively on the market allocation of energy supplies. 
466 
 
When it comes to natural gas, a commodity still largely reliant on pipeline 
infrastructure and long-term supply contracts, overtly political considerations have 
remained dominant. The European Union, for example, has yet to produce a coherent 
energy policy or to perfect a ‘real internal energy market’ (European Commission 2007, 
p. 6). There are very significant differences in the energy mix and strategies of member 
states whose perspectives remain stubbornly national. Thus the Commission’s principal 
approach has been to seek energy security through the perfection of a properly 
functioning, interconnected and transparent internal energy market. There has also been 
a largely unsuccessful attempt to extend EU liberalising regulatory practices to the EU’s 
gas suppliers in its eastern neighbourhood. Failure was demonstrated in the twin 
Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 which were only resolved through EU mediated 
political agreement between Russia and Ukraine. 
Russia, having rejected the EU’s invitation to subscribe to the Energy Charter 
Treaty, increasingly relies on its economic power derived from natural resources and 
energy services. It uses the mechanism of ‘pipeline politics’ to compensate for its loss 
of superpower status and to preserve its zone of influence, particularly in the Caspian 
region and Central and Eastern Europe (Müller-Kraenner 2008, pp. 47–56). The EU 
counterpart is the suggestion that security of supply can be achieved through 
diversification involving new pipelines circumventing Russian territory, Nabucco 
providing the best known example. Youngs (2009) suggests that the EU is in fact caught 
on the horns of a dilemma, between attempts to install market-based governance of 
energy supplies and an essentially realist approach to the geopolitics of pipelines. In the 
US, by contrast, new shale gas discoveries over the last few years have – for now – 
made the country virtually independent from imports. The situation is, of course, 
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completely different for oil supplies, even though the US, if it was minded to incur the 
costs, could achieve a degree of autarchy in this sector too. 
 The uncertain future evoked by realist commentators is not merely concerned 
with ‘above-ground’, political-economic factors, but intimately bound up with the status 
of ‘below-ground’ energy reserves. While the momentous increase in energy prices 
during 2004–2008 may have been partly caused by the growing ‘financialization’ of 
energy markets and an upsurge in speculation (Bradshaw 2010, p. 276), there is now a 
strong chorus of voices pointing to underlying factors of supply and demand. Data 
problems caused by failure to report or intentional misreporting cannot conceal a 
general pattern of stagnant reserves (Owen et al. 2010). The possibility of a significant 
future shortfall in oil supplies is supported by a raft of additional arguments. First, 
significant additional demand will come from emerging economies, especially India and 
China, and may result in global energy demand growth of 36 percent by 2035, with 
demand for oil projected to grow by 15 percent (IEA 2010). Second, considerable 
investments will be needed to expand (or even maintain) supply because there will be 
growing reliance on non-conventional, more expensive oils from tar sands, enhanced oil 
recovery, or even coal liquefaction. Such investments, however, will be hindered by 
short-term price volatility. 
Third, even those countries with the capacity to ramp up production of fossil 
fuels will struggle to increase exports. Many energy-rich countries – for example Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Venezuela – are dominated by state-owned companies which frequently 
lack the capital or expertise to substantially increase production. Moreover, substantial 
energy subsidies have long been employed by these and other governments to reduce 
energy poverty and secure the consent of their populations. Expectations of cheap 
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energy and a lack of interest in energy efficiency are now so entrenched in most energy-
rich countries that a continued rise in energy demand, which could ultimately cancel out 
increased production, is entirely possible (Rubin 2009). 
Critics of such projections highlight a decade-long history of erroneous 
predictions of scarcity. They argue that the supply of fossil fuels will be ensured by 
technological change, which can unlock previously unprofitable reserves, and higher 
prices triggering increased investment and exploration. At most, they acknowledge the 
potential for politically created supply crises through increasing resource nationalism 
and insufficient investment (Radetzki 2010). This riposte, however, is less forceful now 
than in the past. Even the traditionally conservative IEA has accepted the tenor of the 
end of ‘easy oil’ (Bradshaw 2010, p. 277) and conceded that crude oil production will 
never again reach its ‘all-time peak’ of 2006 (IEA 2010, p. 48). Because this entails a 
switch to non-conventional oils and a progressively lower ‘energy return on 
investment’, it is likely to contribute to rising oil prices. 
 Besides oil supplies, the general picture for fossil fuels is even more contested. 
Given recent technological advances in shale gas production and underground coal 
gasification, it remains very uncertain when tangible scarcities will materialize. With 
regard to oil, however, the significance of the ‘peak oil’ thesis is that both materially 
and politically induced supply shortages may well occur. The combined effect of 
uncertainty and price volatility cements the high status of energy security on 
governments’ agendas because it suggests serious implications for economic 
development and heightened international competition for scarcer energy resources. 
 
2.1 The Pursuit of Global Energy Security 
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Given the revitalized interest in energy issues, there is now a burgeoning literature both 
on national and on global energy governance, including the security dimension. In 
institutional terms, however, the idea of collective energy security has only made very 
limited progress over the last few decades. Continuing international discord is 
underpinned by the fundamentally divergent interests of fossil-fuel exporting and 
importing countries. For OPEC member states and other important exporters, energy 
security is primarily a question of stable and predictable demand from industrialized 
economies. The latter, on the other hand, created the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
in 1974 to coordinate their response to future oil crises and provide information and 
expertise for national energy policy. For importing countries, energy security hence 
equates to security of supply. 
Although the fierce producer-consumer clashes of the 1970s are unlikely to 
return, the bifurcated structure of energy security policy has proved persistent. The 
establishment of the International Energy Forum (IEF) in 1991 was intended to signal a 
new era. It provides a basis for enhanced producer-consumer cooperation and already 
features initiatives on improving the transparency of oil and gas data with regard to 
production and investment levels. But a legacy of conflict and ‘deep-rooted mutual 
suspicion’ has so far stood in the way of major governance breakthroughs (Lesage et al. 
2010, p. 62). The EU is a supporter of multilateralism but the approach of its member 
states to energy security is often to secure a network of bilateral deals with neighbours. 
To bolster the case for global cooperation, commentators have underlined the 
high degree of interdependence (Yueh 2010) which typifies global energy relations. In 
theoretical terms, this condition has long applied in a globalising world. The drive 
towards an efficiently functioning global energy market (primarily for fossil fuels) is 
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nothing less than an institutionalization of economic interdependence. But in practical 
terms, shared vulnerability was brought to the fore by surging energy prices during 
2004–2008. From 2005 onwards, several G-8 meetings treated energy as a high priority 
and initiated a number of assessments and action plans by drawing on the IEA’s 
expertise (Lesage et al. 2010, Ch. 7). 
A minimal common ground between consumer and producer countries is the 
avoidance of extreme price volatility because it makes planning for the future 
exceedingly difficult. For example, the budgets of fossil fuel exporting countries were 
initially buoyed by rising revenues, then shrank suddenly when the financial crisis hit 
and prices collapsed. Given the nature of energy policy, however, it is unlikely that UN 
institutions will take the lead in this venture. Even though many UN organizations and 
programmes also pursue energy-related activities, the envisaged central organizational 
node, UN-Energy, is currently no more than an embryonic focal point. Therefore, in a 
‘business-as-usual’ scenario of global energy governance, serious coordination will 
remain the preserve of ‘coalitions of the willing’, while broader multilateral processes 
are most likely to proceed through the UN climate change regime (UNFCCC) 
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010, p. 193). As we argue in the final section of this chapter, 
this regulatory dynamic would likely increase the compatibility of energy security and 
climate change mitigation. To substantiate this point, however, we first turn towards the 
notion of climate security. 
 
3 CLIMATE SECURITY 
Climate security has its roots in the environmental security debate. The critical 
questions raised and empirical results first offered in the early 1990s are equally valid 
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for today's discussions.2 Unsurprisingly, in theoretical terms the precise meaning of 
climate security therefore remains contested. Understandings range from the adaptive 
capacity and resilience of societies in the face of extreme weather events to ambitious 
mitigation which reduces the risk of catastrophic consequences. Yet, in the realm of 
international climate governance, political consensus has developed around a precise 
number to distinguish ‘manageable’ from ‘dangerous’ climate change: this is the 
famous 2˚C threshold. While the concept of environmental security has long been 
present in discussions about environmental governance, the related notion of climate 
security is a relative newcomer. This process of ‘securitization’ may be understood as a 
gradual and mainly discursive accomplishment from a constructivist perspective or as 
an inevitable and necessary development from a rationalist standpoint. 
A constructivist approach would trace the rise of the climate security discourse 
over the past few years. Some have pinpointed the year 2002 as the point at which the 
political mainstream acknowledged potential security implications. According to 
Dupont (2008, p. 30), a report commissioned by the Pentagon (Schwartz and Randall 
2003) helped trigger a learning process through which climate change ‘metamorphosed 
from a boutique environmental concern to a first-order foreign-policy and national-
security problem that is now being ranked alongside terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.’ The following years did indeed witness a flurry of 
similar, if more sophisticated, assessments, most prominently a 2007 report by a US 
think tank (CNA Corporation), a 2008 EU report on ‘Climate Change and International 
Security’, and an explicit recognition by the 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review and 
by the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review. 
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Although there are still some doubts about the extent and durability of the 
securitization process3 (Scott 2008; Mobjörk et al. 2010), the debate on climate change 
and security in the UN Security Council (April 2007) may come to be seen as a genuine 
watershed. While most developing countries resisted the security framing and favoured 
environment/development discourses, small-island developing states (SIDS) – ranking 
among the most vulnerable nations – sided with industrialized countries to support an 
active role for the Council in climate change governance (Detraz and Betsill 2009, p. 
312). In July 2011, Germany reintroduced the issue at the Council. There was 
agreement on the significance of climate change, but no consensus on the appropriate 
international forum for its discussion. China and Russia, supported by G-77 members 
argued that the Council was ill equipped to cover a topic that was the proper 
responsibility of the UNFCCC (MacFarquhar 2011). Despite the session ending without 
tangible results, these high-level diplomatic discussions have arguably ensured the 
presence of climate security considerations on the agendas of governments and 
international organizations. 
A rationalist approach places greater emphasis on the expected impacts of 
climate change and the likely gamut of security responses they are likely to trigger. One 
of way of developing such predictive capacity is to construct scenarios based on the best 
available climate science. Another is to study historical instances in which climatic 
factors seem to have played a critical role, for example the decline or collapse of ancient 
civilizations (Dupont 2008, p. 31). Quantitative methodologies can equally be applied. 
Lewis (2009, p. 1199) thus cites a Chinese study concluding that 70–80 percent of ‘peak 
war activity’ in China’s history took place during unusually cold or warm climatic 
periods which sharply reduced land productivity. 
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A combination of these analytical pathways holds insights for all major strands 
of security thinking. For proponents of national security priorities, climate change fits 
into the category of unconventional, destabilising ‘threat multipliers’ that could cause 
state failure, foment extremism, trigger migratory waves, and physically endanger 
military installations at home and abroad. This was the thrust of the 2008 paper 
developed, with special emphasis on climate change and the Arctic, by the EU’s Javier 
Solana (European Council 2008). For advocates of human security approaches, climate 
change impacts pose grave challenges to the twin objectives of ‘freedom from fear’ and 
‘freedom from want’ by undermining stable livelihoods and imposing significant and 
costly adjustments on frequently vulnerable communities. 
Third, what marks out climate change from other non-conventional security 
threats is its disruptive effect on ecological, ‘planetary’ security. By adversely affecting 
the capacity of the atmosphere to render the ‘ecosystem service’ of providing a stable 
climatic system, rapid (and potentially abrupt) human-induced climate change may pose 
an existential threat to the biosphere, including human civilization itself. To use the 
terminology of the Copenhagen School, what is evident here is a shift in the referent 
object of security from the nation state, to the individual in society and finally to the 
planetary biosphere itself. 
 
3.1 Reactive Climate Security 
The argument about fundamental ecological security and climate change impacts has 
been implicit in the literature since the 1970s. But now that attention to the security 
implications of climate change is growing, the focus is often re-adjusted onto reactive 
policies, such as coping mechanisms and adaptation measures. This strategic shift in 
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policy formulation is justified by two weighty arguments. First, the inertia of the climate 
system implies that the current concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is already 
sufficient to generate a significant degree of global warming over the coming decades. 
Second, the recognition of inevitable impacts is joined by pragmatic motivations. As 
David Keith (2009, p. 56) describes it, in contrast to globally coordinated mitigation 
measures, ‘the self-interest of nations, firms and individuals will work to drive measures 
to ease adaptation to the changing climate since the benefits of adaptation can be 
captured locally where money is spent.’ 
Apart from positive results for human security, such benefits can equally be 
understood as the avoidance of violent conflict. Certainly, the causal connection 
between climate change and conflict remains hotly contested. Yet, a broad-based, if 
minimal, consensus has emerged around the proposition that violent conflict rests on 
numerous, complex socio-economic and political – as well as climatic – processes and 
that the latter may constitute a ‘non-essential’ causal factor (Mazo 2010, p. 40). 
Among the expected consequences of climate change are sea-level rise, altered 
precipitation patterns, an increase in extreme weather events, melting glaciers, 
increasing burdens of infectious diseases, and the progressive acidification of the oceans 
(Dupont 2008, p. 32). When set against a number of separate trends, such as population 
growth, it is evident that climate change will contribute to increasing water and food 
insecurity around the world.4 Whereas profound societal destabilization will not 
necessarily translate into inter-state warfare, it will harm the prospects for human well-
being and may trigger unprecedented waves of migration, both within and across 
national territories. Some estimates suggest there may be 200 million environmental 
refugees by 2050 (Mazo 2010, p. 129). Furthermore, failing states could unwittingly 
475 
 
‘export’ insecurity well beyond their borders by becoming havens for international 
criminal or terrorist networks. 
If security responses to such instabilities were designed by traditional military 
planners, one may expect the whole gamut of coping and containment tools to be 
applied. Individual states or alliances of states are likely to step up border security and 
the policing of major migratory routes (Rogers 2010). The beginnings of these trends 
can, for instance be discerned in the EU’s Immigration, and Neighbourhood Policies. 
Active intervention in failed states, under the Common Security and Defence Policy, for 
the purpose of conflict prevention, conflict resolution or humanitarian assistance may 
also appear on the agenda alongside EU counter-terrorism efforts. However, many of 
these measures may also strengthen the widespread perception of an ‘uncaring West’. 
This could bolster support for extremist groups5 and perhaps provoke radical civic 
mobilization within developed countries themselves (Mabey 2008, p. 94). 
On the other hand, reactive security responses need not be confined to military 
approaches. Following a human security perspective, there will also be increasing 
interest in emergency adaptation measures and, crucially, in ‘pre-adaptation’ strategies 
such as fostering resilience and ‘climate-proofing’ of critical infrastructures (Adger 
2010; Mazo 2010, p. 102). Much of the climate aid for developing countries – projected 
to reach $100 billion annually by 2020 – is likely to be earmarked for this category of 
actions. Initial projects from late 2010, such as combating coastal erosion in Senegal or 
flood prevention in northern Pakistan, give an indication of what resilience and ‘pre-
adaptation’ mean in practice. 
 
3.2 Preventive Climate Security 
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While few would dispute the need for reactive security policy and adaptation measures, 
the central question is whether these will compete with the requirements of climate 
change mitigation. Given the slow progress of international climate regulation, 
adaptation funding – one of the few issues gathering widespread support – might well 
be employed for policies that further increase carbon emissions. On the other hand, the 
accompanying capacity-building may also serve to improve the effectiveness of 
mitigation policies (Mazo 2010, p. 132). Overall, a broad consensus exists that 
‘sustainable security’ (Dalby 2009, p. 166) can only be achieved if both policy 
objectives are designed for compatibility. The governance arrangements for avoiding 
deforestation (REDD+), currently under discussion in the UNFCCC and affiliated fora, 
represent a test case for this integrated conception. 
Regarding mitigation, ambitious reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are 
essential not only to curb the need for risky and expensive reactive security policies. 
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that the process of climate change may not 
conform to the linear assumptions embodied by relatively conservative modelling 
exercises. Although the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report states that climate change is 
very likely caused by human activity (IPCC 2007), detailed knowledge about the 
precise mechanisms of an enormously complex climatic system remains a work in 
progress. This is reflected by the broad ranges of possible temperature change given in 
the IPCC’s scenarios. Rather than taking scientific uncertainty as a reason for hesitation, 
however, many commentators have pointed out that the probability functions of 
mainstream climate models could be too linear because the climate’s sensitivity to 
GHGs might unexpectedly turn out to be much stronger. Recent developments – such as 
unprecedented reductions in mid-year Arctic sea ice in 2010 and 2012, sustained sea-
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level rises, and higher GHG emissions than projected – have bolstered these concerns 
(Mobjörk et al. 2010, p. 42ff.). 
Unexpectedly rapid or strong climatic changes are not the only scientifically 
grounded scenarios that would likely have severe security consequences. It is equally 
possible that there are non-linear climatic dynamics scientists do not yet understand and 
which therefore cannot be integrated into their models. There are likely to be thresholds 
or ‘tipping points’ which could shift the global or, more likely, regional climate system 
into a new state. Mabey (2008, p. 22) presents a typology of such climatic events, 
distinguishing between ‘high impact reversible events’ (e.g. changing Asian monsoons, 
a weakening Gulf Stream), ‘irreversible impacts’ (e.g. melting glaciers, species 
extinction), and ‘runaway climate change’ whereby feedback loops – triggered by 
events such as melting permafrost soils releasing large quantities of methane – would 
push the climate system into an uncontrollable warming spiral. 
Such ‘high impact/low probability’ scenarios are no mere figment of 
imagination, as the geological record shows that they have occurred in the distant past 
(Mabey 2008, p. 13; Mazo 2010, p. 29). These scenarios are now frequently recognized 
in the scientific and policy literatures. Innovative economic analysis has equally cast 
doubt on conservative ‘median’ damage functions commonly employed by mainstream 
‘gradualism’. Weitzman (2010, p. 24) thus proposes a ‘fat-tailed’ probability 
distribution of climate sensitivity to higher greenhouse gas concentrations. This implies 
a distinct chance (1 percent) of 10 or more degrees of global warming and suggests that 
ambitious mitigation targets would represent an insurance policy against catastrophic 
climate change. 
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Discourses of preventive security strike a similar note. The core argument here 
is that security analysts and military planners have been trained to rely on prudence and 
foresight which may lead them to consider worst-case scenarios rather than mere ‘best 
guesses’ (Dupont 2008; Mabey 2008; Rogers 2010). By implementing this form of 
assessment, analysts may come to recognize that reactive security responses cannot 
adequately deal with scenarios of extreme or abrupt climate change. First, every society 
has a limited adaptive capacity to profound perturbations. Second, as Mabey (2008, p. 
13) puts it, ‘while climate change raises many hard security problems, it [ultimately] has 
no hard security solutions.’ In policy terms, both preventive security and risk-averse 
economic thinking point towards two major undertakings: a rapid transition towards an 
ultra-low carbon economy and enhanced international cooperation on climate 
governance. 
 
4 GOVERNING ENERGY AND CLIMATE SECURITY 
The first two parts of this chapter have come to different conclusions regarding the 
challenges of energy security and climate security. For the former, strong international 
governance mechanisms are desirable but difficult; for the latter, such advances are very 
challenging indeed, but ultimately indispensable. Energy security is largely subject to 
the vagaries of the market and the geo-political manoeuvres of major producers and 
consumers. Institutions such as the International Energy Agency, set up in 1974 by 
OECD countries, or agreements such as the EU-sponsored 1991 Energy Charter Treaty 
have not been able to fundamentally change this dynamic. 
A range of existing governance mechanisms have extended their remit to cover 
climate change – typically viewed as a ‘threat multiplier’. They provide numerous 
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frameworks for collaborative international efforts to react to the effects of climate 
change. The climate issue has permeated the international institutional architecture from 
development organizations interested in adaptation to UN peacekeeping and the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy. Those who oppose a modification of the UN 
Security Council’s activities prefer to keep the Climate Change Convention as the 
appropriate forum and to assert that climate security must be considered as a sustainable 
development issue. Despite recent growing concern with adaptation, the UNFCCC, 
therefore, remains the institutional location for efforts at preventive climate governance. 
Although hailed as a success, the Durban 2011 CoP extended the date for a 
comprehensive new agreement out to 2020. Given this delay and continuing uncertainty 
about the eventual agreement, many major economies have resolved to enact domestic 
climate and energy policies that pursue ‘win-win’ solutions, such as fuel-switching to 
low- and ultra-low-carbon sources, greater energy efficiency, demand reduction, and the 
development of cost-efficient carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology (Froggatt 
and Levi 2009). 
 
4.1 ‘Synergistic’ Climate and Energy Security Policy 
The popularity of ‘synergistic’ approaches is reflected in policy developments in major 
economies around the world. For instance, emerging economies such as China and India 
continue to pursue traditional energy policy centred on diversification of energy 
sources, expansion of fossil-fuel-based energy generation, and the reduction of energy 
poverty. But they are also implementing ‘win-win’ energy-and-climate policies. 
With Chinese oil imports predicted to rise from about half to well over 80 percent of 
domestic needs by 2030 (IEA 2007a), a target of reducing the energy intensity of its 
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economy by 20 percent until 2010 has been raised to 40–45 percent by 2020. This goal 
is to be achieved primarily through energy efficiency measures, but is flanked by an 
ambitious programme of investment in low-carbon energy generation which might lead 
to renewable energy providing one third of total energy generation by 2020. India is 
projected to face an even greater degree of energy dependence, with up to 90 percent of 
oil and a rapidly growing share of natural gas and coal to be imported by 2030 (IEA 
2007b). India’s 2008 ‘National Action Plan on Climate Change’ emphasizes significant 
future investments in solar energy and energy efficiency. 
Even a high-income country such as the US has until now followed a similar 
policy pattern. US energy and climate policy has often depended on traditional notions 
of energy security emphasising domestic production of oil and gas. Yet, a temporary 
confluence with supporters of climate change mitigation brought about the 2007 
‘Energy Independence and Security Act’ which yielded policies on biofuels,6 energy 
efficiency and low-carbon energy generation (Bang 2010). However, there are some 
mid- and high-income countries which have committed to more ambitious and target-
based action on climate mitigation. Mexico, for example, plans to reduce its GHG 
emissions by 30 percent below a business-as-usual scenario by 2020 and 50 percent 
from 2000 levels by 2050. Japan has pledged to reduce its emissions in the same period 
by 25 percent below 1990 levels, although this target will be difficult to achieve. And 
the EU proposed a 20–30 percent cut below 1990 levels, but made the upper figure 
conditional on stronger international reciprocity.7 If current policies on renewable 
energy and energy efficiency are fully implemented, the EU might achieve a 30 percent 
reduction by 2030, but that still leaves a considerable gap to the long-term objective of 
cutting GHG emissions by 80 percent until 2050 (European Commission 2011). 
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By extrapolating from intra-European differences, one can try to deduce the 
main reasons behind the divergent ambitions of these two groups of countries. Marques 
et al. (2010) thus found that investment in renewable energy sources increased in line 
with an EU member state’s dependence on energy imports. Unlike the US, most 
European states – as well as Japan and Mexico – do not currently have the option of 
expanding domestic production of fossil fuels in a cost-effective manner. The EU as a 
whole is projected to see its total import dependency increase from 82.6 percent for 
crude oil and 60.3 percent for natural gas (in 2007) to around 93 percent and over 80 
percent by 2030 (Comolli 2010). In the wake of the 2005–2006 Russia-Ukraine dispute 
over natural gas deliveries, political momentum resulted in the 2008 ‘EU Climate and 
Energy Package’. The Commission has taken a synergistic view: 
<quotation>Action on renewables and energy efficiency, besides tackling climate 
change, will contribute to security of energy supply and help limit the EU’s growing 
dependence on imported energy. It could also create many high-quality jobs in Europe 
and maintain Europe’s technological leadership in a rapidly growing global sector. 
(European Commission 2006, p. 10)</quotation> 
This is matched by calls for cooperation with other players US, China, India, 
Canada and Japan on energy efficiency and renewables, global market access and 
investment trends to achieve better results in multilateral fora such as the UN, the IEA 
and the G-8. ‘If these countries reduce the use of fossil fuels, it will also be beneficial 
for Europe’s energy security’ (European Commission 2006, pp. 16–17). ‘Indeed energy 
must become a central part of all EU external relations; it is crucial to geopolitical 
security, economic stability, social development and international efforts to combat 
climate change’ (European Commission 2007, p. 17). Existing momentum for climate 
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policy was fuelled by newly salient energy security concerns which, in turn, were 
stoked by a more prolonged Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009 which caused 
severe gas shortages in several EU member states. An emerging European energy 
strategy focuses on investments in the diversification of import sources (e.g. alternative 
gas pipelines), the creation of a common internal energy market and exploiting 
untapped potential for energy efficiencies (European Commission 2010). Although 
significant potential for synergies remains, energy security considerations have by now 
largely replaced climate policy objectives as the main driver of regulatory evolution. 
How do these various policies fare when compared with the overarching 
objectives of energy and climate security? The cautious energy-and-climate policy 
packages enacted by China, India, and the US score highly on affordability and 
reliability, while the latter economies benefit from enhanced security of access. 
Moreover, in the longer run, if predictions of rising energy prices come true, first-
movers in energy efficiency and ‘decarbonization’ will reap substantial benefits: they 
will have already reduced their consumption of oil and thus improved their economic 
competitiveness. 
In terms of preventive climate security, however, most policies are still 
inadequate. Although the US intends to cut GHG emissions by 17 percent between 2005 
and 2020, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that energy-
related carbon emissions will grow by 0.2 percent annually until 2035 (EIA 2010, p. 
128). In both China and India, domestic (carbon-heavy) coal will continue to play a 
dominant role in energy generation. EIA figures predict annual growth rates in energy-
related carbon emissions of 2.7 percent (China) and 1.8 percent (India). By contrast, the 
EIA expects an annual reduction in energy-related carbon emissions in OECD-Europe 
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and Japan by 0.2 percent and 0.6 percent respectively. Collectively, the climate and 
energy policies announced by major economies imply very limited progress on climate 
mitigation and in many other developing or emerging economies, the carbon intensity of 
power generation has in fact continued to rise (Tandon 2012). In November 2010, the 
UN Environment Programme calculated that targets and other pledges by major 
economies only amount to 60 percent of the GHG reductions needed to stay below the 
2˚C threshold.8 
 
5 CONCLUSION: THE GOVERNANCE DILEMMA 
According to the then EU Energy Commissioner, ‘climate change and energy security 
are two sides of the same coin. The same remedies must be applied to both problems’ 
(Piebalgs 2009, p. 2). There is certainly a conceptual overlap between energy and 
climate security. Not only are they both, to various degrees, concerned with the 
transition away from a carbon-heavy, fossil-fuel based global economy. They also have 
to confront fundamental scarcities: the scarcity of affordable and readily accessible 
fossil energy or the scarcity of atmospheric ‘carbon space’. Both the energy and the 
climate challenge can therefore benefit from demand reduction as well as from supply-
side measures which diminish both types of scarcity, such as low-carbon energy 
technologies. There is no denying the underlying attraction of this proposition and the 
way in which a ‘synergistic’ approach provides what must be the ultimate ‘win-win’ 
solution neatly addressing energy and climate security concerns through a move to a 
decarbonized economy. 
 The problem is, of course, making the political fit between climate and energy 
security. The orthodox vision of enhanced global energy security, grounded in 
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economic globalization and increasing interdependence, still depends on a compromise 
between producers and consumers of fossil fuels. The sole likely benefit for climate 
governance would be reduced price volatility and hence greater predictability for 
alternative energy investments. Overall, strategies prioritising either national or global 
energy security are likely to result in incremental climate policy and a resort to reactive 
climate security. For such an approach the referent object will continue to be the state. 
 Furthermore, while the various benefits of energy security measures can be 
captured at the national or even regional- or EU-level and are not necessarily dependent 
upon international cooperation, the public good of climatic stability can only be attained 
by concerted efforts at the global level. This is because the global atmosphere can be 
regarded as having the characteristics of a commons. Climatic security defined in terms 
of stability is frequently understood as non-rival and non-excludable public good. It 
requires collective mitigation efforts amongst the largest emitters and mechanisms to 
ensure compliance and avoid ‘free-riding’. The atmosphere also represents a finite 
‘common sink’ for GHG emissions. Most current economic activities constitute a rival 
consumption of ‘carbon space’. And strict international targets would partially enclose 
or ‘privatize’ this resource in order to limit ruinous over-consumption. However, the 
very notion of carbon space, which has become in recent years a key negotiating 
concept for some developing countries, illustrates the extent of the problem of arriving 
at an effective agreement beyond the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.9 
The point here is that much of the world’s limited carbon space has already been 
occupied by the industrialized countries and that justice demands that the remainder be 
used to realize the development objectives of the South. In the climate negotiations 
from Copenhagen (2009) to Durban (2011), the objective of the key players has been to 
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avoid being trapped in an agreement that might imperil short-run national energy 
security. 
The widespread preference for incremental policy reform signifies that national 
energy security will continue to be a ‘far stronger policy driver’ (Froggatt and Levi 
2009, p. 1141) than climate security. Regardless of the progress made through 
synergistic measures, this ‘gradualism’ contains considerable structural bias. First, it 
permits the ‘lock-in’ of fossil- or biofuel-intensive infrastructures, which has important 
consequences for emission trajectories in rapidly industrialising countries. Second, it 
relies on domestic ‘win-win’ policy scenarios which – similar to local benefits derived 
from climate adaptation measures – favour outcomes consistent with reactive climate 
security. Furthermore, integrated global or regional markets for fossil fuels imply that 
national energy-and-climate policies result in ‘carbon leakage’ by lowering 
global/regional energy prices and stimulating energy demand elsewhere. 
A different set of national and international policies would be required if 
governments were to pursue preventive climate security in earnest. At the national level, 
energy and climate policy would prioritize longer-term objectives – security of supply, 
greater foreign policy autonomy and ultra-low carbon emissions – without wholly 
ignoring short-term considerations of affordability, reliability, and political feasibility 
(Compston 2010). There are formidable difficulties here, where developed country 
governments need to overcome the incentives to operate on a short-term basis and to 
work with public opinion. 
In terms of the latter there are mixed messages. For the European Union, ‘[a]n 
EU level solution to the climate problem has served as a convincing narrative to 
persuade EU citizens that there is a need to continue the process of European 
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integration’ (Adelle and Withana 2010, p. 331). There are also significant similarities in 
attitudes in the EU, the US, and other advanced countries. These include concern about 
climate change laced with some scepticism about the science and an unwillingness to 
make personally costly changes with the requirements of economic growth being placed 
above climate protection. While there is support for renewables in general, significant 
opposition exists to particular technologies such as wind farms (ibid., p. 327). One key 
difference which may help to explain divergence between EU and US policy and which 
is hardly merited by their respective situations is that ‘energy security is considered a 
much more important factor in the US than in EU and is given greater priority than 
environmental protection by a significant number of Americans’ (ibid., p. 329). Thus, 
‘for governments faced with tough policy choices, the public’s reluctance to accept 
costly policy choices could limit the use and range of policy solutions in the transition 
to a low-carbon economy’ (ibid., p. 328). Amongst the BASIC countries the demands 
facing policy-makers are bound to be more extreme, with energy priorities for 
development dominating other concerns and indeed being fundamental to the 
continuing legitimacy of governments. 
There is also the question of the interaction between national and international 
climate and energy policies. Is it possible that international commitments could provide 
momentum for domestic policy reform? There is some evidence that the search for 
short-term national energy security does not always prevail and that international norms 
and commitments can have a significant effect, especially if the prestige and credibility 
of governments is engaged. The adoption of the Emissions Trading Scheme by the EU 
provides a case in point. This particular ‘flexibility mechanism’ had been opposed prior 
to Kyoto but became the bedrock of the Union’s approach to climate, driven like the 
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‘burden sharing’ agreement before it by the requirements to maintain its leading 
position at the international level. The evidence is not as strong, but Chinese and Indian 
policy changes, involving the announcement of energy efficiency targets, were certainly 
stimulated by the need to generate a credible position in advance of the 2009 
Copenhagen CoP. It remains the case, however, that more often than not energy security 
drives climate policy, although the result may not always be negative. In this regard the 
EU’s 2006 gas crisis was one of the incentives to agree the 2008 ‘Climate and Energy 
Package’ that provided the policy basis for the implementation of the Union’s 20/30 
percent emissions reduction commitment. 
If global climatic stability became an actual policy priority, it would not only 
deliver important ‘co-benefits’ for global energy security, but would also provide a 
genuine basis for implementing a preventive climate security strategy. To dilute both 
domestic and international obstacles to ambitious climate policy, advanced 
industrialized countries would have to engineer an ‘energy revolution’ – through 
enormous investments, technology transfer, and capacity-building in developing 
countries. The necessary coalitions would have to be forged among major energy-
consuming countries and not rely on older practices of producer-consumer conciliation 
(Mabey 2008, p. 68). 
Energy and climate are thus not only materially intertwined, but also 
interdependent politically. Without increased availability of practical and affordable 
energy technologies to enable climate-friendly economic development, international 
climate governance will not progress substantially. What the public goods analysis 
makes clear is that the regulatory ‘direction of travel’ should still lead from climate to 
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energy – rather than vice versa – because only this arrangement could ensure that long-
term strategic foresight prevails over short-term pragmatism. 
 
 
NOTES 
1 The substantial literature on environmental security was stimulated in particular by the 
ending of the Cold War. In general, it attempts to tease out the relationship between 
environmental degradation and conflict as in the extensive work of Homer-Dixon 
(1994). Deudney and Mathews (1999) explore some of problems of securitizing the 
environment. 
2 For an excellent survey of different IR perspectives on climate security during this 
period, see Stripple (2002). 
3 The reference here is of course to the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al. 1998). To 
some extent, this process of ‘securitization’ amplifies ideas proposed in the 1970s when 
natural resources and the environment were first recognized as security issues. In this 
sense, energy security and climate security, the core issues of this article, have merely 
been recast as critical components of security thinking in the twenty-first century. 
4 The 2011 Climate Change Vulnerability Index by the British consultancy Maplecroft 
rates 16 countries as being at ‘extreme risk’, with Bangladesh, India and Madagascar 
among the top three. 
5 Several southern diplomats have already described climate change as an ‘act of 
aggression’ and even extremist groups such as al-Qaeda have specifically referred to 
Western responsibility for climate change and the US refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol 
(Scott 2008, p. 607; Mazo 2010, p. 129). 
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6 US biofuels such as corn-based ethanol, however, have been accused of producing 
higher GHG emissions than imported oil. 
7 A significant proportion of Japanese and European emission reductions will likely be 
achieved by international offset procedures such as the Clean Development Mechanism. 
8 See the UNEP Emissions Gap Report at 
www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport (accessed 21 February 2013). 
The outcomes of the 2010 Cancún and 2011 Durban climate change conferences have 
not altered the validity of these calculations. 
9 ‘Carbon space’ is a special case of the more general concept of ‘environmental 
utilization space’ (Opschoor 1995). Calculated on a historical basis, it has become part 
of the negotiating position of India China and the BASIC group at international climate 
conferences (see Tata Institute of Social Sciences 2010). Calculations are made on a 
national basis, but it would be equally possible to arrive at a different outcome on the 
basis of individual carbon entitlements. 
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